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Abstract
Deep neural networks were shown to be vulner-
able to single pixel modifications. However, the
reason behind such phenomena has never been
elucidated. Here, we propose Propagation Maps
which show the influence of the perturbation in
each layer of the network. Propagation Maps re-
veal that even in extremely deep networks such
as Resnet, modification in one pixel easily propa-
gates until the last layer. In fact, this initial local
perturbation is also shown to spread becoming a
global one and reaching absolute difference val-
ues that are close to the maximum value of the
original feature maps in a given layer. Moreover,
we do a locality analysis in which we demonstrate
that nearby pixels of the perturbed one in the one-
pixel attack tend to share the same vulnerability,
revealing that the main vulnerability lies in neither
neurons nor pixels but receptive fields. Hopefully,
the analysis conducted in this work together with
a new technique called propagation maps shall
shed light into the inner workings of other adver-
sarial samples and be the basis of new defense
systems to come.
1. Introduction
Recently, a series of papers have shown that deep neural
networks (DNN) are vulnerable to various types of attacks
(Szegedy, 2014),(Nguyen et al., 2015),(Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2017),(Brown et al., 2017),(Su et al., 2017), (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016).(Carlini & Wagner, 2017c),(Kurakin
et al., 2016),(Sharif et al., 2016), (Athalye & Sutskever,
2018) However, the reasons underlying these vulnerabilities
are still largely unknown. We argue that one of the most
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Figure 1. a) Propagation Maps (PMmax) of a successful one-pixel
attack on Resnet shows how the influence of one pixel perturbation
grows and spreads (bright colors show differences in feature map
that are close to the maximum original layer output). b) Average
Propagation Map over the entire set of propagation maps shows the
overall distribution of attacks and their propagation. c) Illustration
of locality analysis.
important facets of adversarial machine learning resides in
its investigative nature. In other words, adversarial machine
learning provides us with key tools to understand current
DNNs. As much as attacks tells us about the security behind
DNNs, they also tells us to what extent DNNs can reason
over data and what do they understand to be, for example,
the concept of a ”car” or ”horse”.
In this paper, inspired by recent attacks and defenses we
propose a technique called propagation maps that would be
able to explain most of them. Here, giving the constrained
space, we focus on one attack which is puzzling and largely
unexplained, the one-pixel attack. Propagation maps enable
us to show how one pixel perturbation may grow in influence
over the layers and spread over many pixels to cause a
final change in class. Moreover, statistical properties of the
propagation reveal many properties of the attacks as well as
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their distribution (Figure 1).
Additionally, to further understand the one-pixel attack a
locality analysis is performed. The locality analysis con-
sists of executing the attack in nearby pixels of a successful
one-pixel attack, i.e., using the same pixel perturbation but
different pixel position. Indeed, the success rate of nearby
pixel is effective and equal among different neural networks
(Figure 1), showing that rather than pixels or neurons, the
vulnerability lies in some of the receptive fields. This re-
veals an interesting property shared among DNNs which is
independent of the model or attack success rate.
2. Related Work
In the following subsections an overview of different types
of attacks and a brief overview of the related works will be
covered.
2.1. Adversarial Samples and Different Types of
Attacks
The samples that can make machine learning algorithms
misclassify received the name of adversarial samples. Let
f(x) ∈ Rk be the output of a machine learning algorithm in
which x ∈ Rm×n is the input of the algorithm for input and
output of sizes m × n and k respectively. It is possible to
define adversarial samples x’ explicitly as follows:
x’ = x + x
{x’ ∈ Rn | argmax
j
(f(x’)j) 6= argmax
i
(f(x)i), (1)
in which x ∈ Rm×n is a small perturbation added to the
input.
In adversarial machine learning one want to search for ad-
versarial samples. For that it is possible to use the knowl-
edge of the DNN in question to craft samples such as using
back-propagation for obtaining gradient information and
subsequently using gradient descent as done by the “fast
gradient sign” proposed by I.J. Goodfellow et al. (Good-
fellow et al., 2014a). There is also the greedy perturbation
searching method proposed by S.M. Moosavi-Dezfooli et
al. (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016) and N. Papernot et al.
utilize Jacobian matrix of the function learned during train-
ing to create a saliency map which will guide the search for
adversarial samples (Papernot et al., 2016a).
However, it is possible to search for adversarial samples
without taking into account the internal characteristics of
DNNs. This type of model agnostic search is also called
black-box attack. To search for adversarial samples in this
scenario, it is common to use perturbations that increase
a given soft label f(x)t (targetted attack) in which t is the
index of the target class. In other words, they can be defined
as the following optimization problem:
maximize
x
f(x + x)t
subject to ‖x‖ ≤ L
(2)
Regarding untargeted attacks, the objective function can be
defined, for example, as the minimization of the soft label
for the outputted class f(x)i. See the complete equation
below.
maximize
x
− f(x + x)i
subject to ‖x‖ ≤ L
(3)
The minimization of the difference between the highest soft-
label index and the second highest one is also one of the
other possibilities of objective function for untargeted at-
tacks. There are many black-box attacks in the literature. To
cite some (Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2017),(Papernot
et al., 2017),(Dang et al., 2017).
It is important to note that  should be small enough to not
allow an image to become a different class. Such a trans-
formation would invalidate the adversarial sample creation
because it is not a misclassification. Since most attacks use
perturbations which comprise of the whole image, ‖x‖ ≤ L
is a good optimization constraint. However, it is also pos-
sible to look the other way around and deal with few per-
turbed dimensions. In this case, the constraint changes to
a L0 norm which actually counts the dimensions of the the
perturbation, i.e., the total number of non-zero elements in
the perturbation vector. The complete equation is as follows:
maximize
e(x)∗
fadv(x + e(x))
subject to ‖e(x)‖0 ≤ d,
(4)
where d is a small number of dimensions (d = 1 for the
one-pixel attack).
2.2. Recent Advances in Attacks and Defenses
The question of if machine learning is secure was asked
some time ago (Barreno et al., 2006),(Barreno et al., 2010).
However, it was only in 2013 that Deep Neural Networks’
(DNN) security was completely put into question (Szegedy,
2014). C. Szegedy et al. demonstrated that by adding noise
to an image it is possible to produce a visually identical
image which can make DNNs misclassify. This was conter-
intuitive, since the DNNs that misclassified had a very high
accuracy in the tests rivaling even the accuracy of human
beings.
Recently, the vulnerabilities of neural networks were shown
to be even more aggravating. For example, A. Nguyen et al.
did a series of experiments in which images were continu-
ously developed to fool a machine learning algorithm. They
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found out that DNNs give high confidence results to ran-
dom noise. DNNs also tend to classify patterns or textures,
such as the stripes of a bus as a bus, with high confidency
(Nguyen et al., 2015). Universal adversarial perturbations in
which a single crafted perturbation is able to make a DNN
misclassify multiple samples was also shown to be possible
(Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017). In (Brown et al., 2017), the
authors showed that it is possible to make DNNs misclassify
by adding a patch to an image. Interestingly, each patch is
a targetted attack, i.e., a banana patch would make a DNN
misclassify the image as a banana when added. Moreover,
in (Su et al., 2017) it was shown that even one pixel could
make DNNs’ misclassify. Indicating that although DNNs
have a high accuracy in recognition tasks, their ”understand-
ing” of what is a ”dog” or ”cat” is still very different from
human beings. In fact, adversarial samples can be used to
evaluate the robustness of a DNN (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2016).(Carlini & Wagner, 2017c).
Although much of the research in adversarial machine learn-
ing is conducted under ideal conditions in a laboratory, the
same techniques are not difficult to apply to real world sce-
narios because printed out adversarial samples still work,
i.e., many adversarial samples are robust against different
light conditions (Kurakin et al., 2016). In (Sharif et al.,
2016), it was show that it is possible to build glasses that
could fool DNNs to believe a given person is somebody else.
The glasses were custom made and had some orientation
in mind when designed. In fact, in (Athalye & Sutskever,
2018) the authors go a step further and verify the existence
of 3d adversarial objects which can fool DNNs even when
viewpoint, noise, and different light conditions are taking
into consideration.
Defensive systems and detection systems were soon pro-
posed to mitigate some of the problems. Regarding defen-
sive systems, defensive distillation in which a smaller neural
network squeezes the content learned by the original one
was proposed as a defense (Papernot et al., 2016b) however
it was soon shown to not be robust enough (Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2017c). Adversarial training was also proposed in wchi
adversarial images are added to the training dataset in such
a way that the DNN will be able to correctly classify them,
increasing its robustness (Goodfellow et al., 2014b),(Huang
et al., 2015), (Madry et al., 2018). However this technique
is still vulnerable to black-box attacks (Trame`r et al., 2018).
There are many recent variations proposed recently (Ma
et al., 2018), (Buckman et al.), (Guo et al.), (Dhillon et al.),
(Xie et al.), (Song et al.), (Samangouei et al.), it is out of
the scope of this article to review all of them. Most of these
defenses create some sort of gradient masking, called obfus-
cated gradients. They are carefully analyzed and many of
their shortcommings are explained in (Athalye et al., 2018)
Regarding detection systems, if it is hard to defend perhaps
it would be possible to detect attacks. A study from (Grosse
et al., 2017) revealed that indeed some adversarial samples
have different statistical properties. Moreover, such a de-
tection system would increase the cost of attacks. In (Xu
et al., 2017), the authors propose an interesting method in
which the classifier compares its prediction with a predic-
tion of the same input but ”squeezed” (either color or spatial
smoothing). This allow classifiers to detect with high accu-
racy adversarial samples. Having said that, many detection
systems are subject to fail when adversarial samples differ
from test conditions (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a),(Carlini &
Wagner, 2017b). Thus, the increase in cost in part of the
attacker seems certain but the clear benefits of detection
systems remains unconclusive.
There are many works in attacks and defenses but the reason
behind such lack of robustness for accurate classifiers is
still largely unknown. In (Goodfellow et al., 2014b) it is
argued that DNNs’ linearity are one of the main reasons.
If this is the case, perhaps hybrid systems that can lever-
age the non-linearity that arise from complex models by
using evolutionary based optimization techniques such as
self-organizing classifiers (Vargas et al., 2013) and neuroevo-
lution with unified neuron models (Vargas & Murata, 2017)
would make for a promising investigation.
3. One-Pixel Attack
One-Pixel Attack investigated the opposite extreme of most
attacks to date. Instead of searching for small spreaded
perturbation, it focus on perturbing just one pixel. This
vulnerability to one-pixel is a totally different scenario, i.e.,
neural networks that are vulnerable to usual attacks may not
be vulnerable to one-pixel attack and vice-versa.
To achieve such an attack in a black-box scenario the authors
used differential evolution which is a simple yet effective
evolutionary (DE) algorithm (Storn & Price, 1997). A can-
didate solution is coded as a pixel position and its related
perturbation. The DE search for promising candidate so-
lutions by minimizing the output label of the correct class
(Equation 3). In this paper, we use the same differential
evolution settings as the original paper (Su et al., 2017).
However, here we define a successful attack as an adver-
sarial attack made over a correctly classified sample. As a
consequence, adversarial attacks over already missclassified
samples will be ignored.
4. Propagation Maps
Perturbation on the input image propagates throughout the
neural network to change its class in adversarial samples.
However, much of this process is unknown. In other words,
how does this perturbation causes a change in the class
label? What are the internal differences between adversarial
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Figure 2. Propagation Map (PMmax) for Resnet using a sample from CIFAR. For this experiment, Equation 6 is used. The sample above
is incorrectly classified as automobile after one pixel is changed in the image. Values are scaled with the maximum value for each layer of
the feature maps being the maximum value achievable in the color map. Therefore, bright values show that the difference in activation is
close to the maximum value in the feature map, demonstrating the strength of the former.
Figure 3. Propagation Map (PMavg) for Resnet using a sample from CIFAR. For this experiment, Equation 7 is used. Values are scaled
with the maximum value for each layer of the feature maps being the maximum value achievable in the color map.
attacks and failed attacks if any?
Here, to walk towards an answer to the questions above
we propose a technique called propagation maps which can
reveal the perturbation throughout the layers. Propagation
maps consists of comparing the feature maps of both adver-
sarial and original samples. Specifically, by calculating the
difference between the feature maps and averaging them (or
getting their maximum value) for each convolutional layer,
the perturbation’s influence can be estimated. Consider an
element-wise maximum of a three dimensional array O for
indices a, b and k to be described as:
Ma,b = max
k
(Oa,b,0, Oa,b,1, ..., Oa,b,k), (5)
where M is the resulting two dimensinal array.
Therefore, for a layer i, its respective propagation map PMi
can be obtained by:
PMi = max
k
(FMi,k − FMadvi,k ), (6)
where FMi,k and FMadvi,k are respectively the feature maps
for layer i and kernel k of the natural (original) and adver-
sarial samples.
Alternatively, one may wish to see the average over the
filters which exposes a slightly different influence diluted
over the kernels in the same layer. It can be computed as
follows:
PMi =
1
nk
∑
k
(FMi,k − FMadvi,k ), (7)
where nk is the number of filters.
PMmax and PMavg will be used to differentiate between
Propagation Maps using Equations 6 and 7. Notice that in
order to put the perturbation’s influence in the same scale of
the original feature map, the maximum scale value will be
set to the original feature map when plotting.
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Figure 4. Propagation Map (PMmax) for a perturbation that failed to change the class for Resnet using a sample from CIFAR. For this
experiment, Equation 6 is used. The sample above is correctly classified as cat even after one pixel is changed in the image. Values are
scaled with the maximum value for each layer of the feature maps being the maximum value achievable in the color map.
Figure 5. Propagation Map (PMmax) for a perturbation that failed to change the class for Resnet using a sample from CIFAR. For this
experiment, Equation 6 is used. The sample above is correctly classified as horse even after one pixel is changed in the image. Values are
scaled with the maximum value for each layer of the feature maps being the maximum value achievable in the color map.
5. Propagation Maps for the One-Pixel Attack
To investigate how a single pixel perturbation can cause
changes in class, we will make use of the proposed propaga-
tion maps. This will allow us to vizualize the perturbations
in each of the layers of the neural network.
For the experiments, Resnet, which is one of the most accu-
rate types of neural networks, is used. Each of the subsec-
tions below investigate a specific scenario.
5.1. Single Pixel Perturbations that Change Class
In Figure 2, the propagation map (PMmax) of a successful
one-pixel attack is shown. The perturbation is shown to start
small and localized and then spread in deeper layers. In
the last layer, the perturbation spread enough to influence
strongly more than a quarter of the feature map. This is
the element-wise maximum behavior which allows us to
identify how strong is the maximum difference in feature
maps.
The propagation map based on averaged differences
(PMavg) show that the difference is concentraded in some
feature maps (Figure 3). Moreover this average difference
is kept more or less the same throughout the layers. In the
case of PMmax, the difference had a sort of wave behavior,
sometimes growing in strength, sometimes slightly fading
away. All observed adversarial samples shared similar fea-
tures of propagation maps. This is to be expected, since they
need to influence enough in order to change the class.
Surprisingly, one pixel change can cause influences that
spread over the entire feature map, specially in deeper layers.
This also contradicts to some extent the expectation that high
level features will be processed in deeper layers.
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Figure 6. Propagation Map (PMmax) for a perturbation that failed to change the class for Resnet using a sample from CIFAR. For this
experiment, Equation 6 is used. The sample above is correctly classified as airplane even after one pixel is changed in the image. Values
are scaled with the maximum value for each layer of the feature maps being the maximum value achievable in the color map.
5.2. Single Pixel Perturbations that Do Not Change
Class
Successful one-pixel attacks were shown to grow its influ-
ence throughout the layers, culminating in a strong and
spread influence in the last layers. Here we change the posi-
tion of the pixel to unable the attack to succeed. Figure 4
shows that in such a case the influence’s intensity decreases.
In fact, in the last layer it is almost imperceptible the in-
fluence. However, this is not the rule. A counterexample
is shown in Figure 5 in which a pixel is changed without
changing the class label. This time however, the perturba-
tion propagates strongly, being as strong if not stronger than
the successful one-pixel attack observed in Figure 2. One
might argue that the influence has caused the confidence to
decrease but not enough to cause the change. For this case,
indeed the confidence decreases from 99% to 52%. How-
ever, Figure 6 has a similar behavior although the confidence
decreases only one percentage (from 100% to 99%).
Thus, qualitatively speaking, unsuccessful one-pixel attacks
not necessarily fail to achieve a high influence in the last
layer. It depends strongly on the pixel position and sample.
This is accordance with saliency maps which show that
different parts of the image have different importance in the
recognition process (Simonyan et al., 2013).
6. Statistical Evaluation of Propagation Maps
In previous sections, single attacks were analyzed in the
light of examples and counterexamples. These experiments
were important to investigate what happens in detail for each
of these attacks. However, they do not tell much about the
distribution of attacks. This section aims to fill this gap by
investigating the attacks’ distribution and other statistically
relevant data.
By evaluating the average of PMmean over successful at-
tacks, we can observe the attack distribution over the entire
feature map as well as their average spreadness over the
layers (Figure 7). The successful attacks seem to concetrate
mostly close to the center of the image. In deeper layers, the
influence expands and increase in intensity, specially at its
center. This reveals that the behavior observed in Figure 2
is usual for most of the attacks.
Given this distribution for successful attacks, it would be
interesting to contrast them with failed attempts. This would
enable us to further clarify the characteristics of a successful
attack. However, as shown in Figure 8, most of the previous
features are shared. The only observed difference is the
initial spreadness and spreadness. In other words, failed
attacks tend to be farther away from the center of the image
and spread more equally than their successful counterparts.
Notice that both Figure 7 and 8 are not scaled with the
maximum feature map, since we are interested here in their
distribution rather than intensity.
To further clarify if there is any explicit difference between
successful and failed attacks, we explictly calculated the
mean over all the feature maps for the previous successful
and unsuccessful attacks. The plot is shown in Figure 9.
The average difference is also unable to distinghish between
successful and failed attacks, with both having very similar
behavior.
7. Position Sensitivity and Locality
The one-pixel attack works by searching for a one-pixel
perturbation where the class can be modified (misclassified).
This search process is costly but to what extent is the success
of the attack dependent on its position?
Here the position sentitivity of the attack will be analyzed.
First, we consider an attack in which a pixel is randomly
chosen to be perturbated by the same ammount that could
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Figure 7. Average of PMmean over 318 successful attacks on Resnet from CIFAR dataset, i.e., all successful attacks from 1000 trials.
Figure 8. Average of PMmean over 682 unsuccessful attacks on Resnet from CIFAR dataset, i.e., all failed attacks from 1000 trials.
create an adversarial sample. The results, which are shown
in Table 1, demonstrate that random pixel attacks have a very
low success rate. This suggests that position is important
and by disregarding it is almost impossible to achieve a
successful attack. Having said that, the attack on nearby
pixels (i.e., the eight adjacent pixels) shows a positive result.
In fact, if we consider that this attack is not conducting any
search at all but only taking one random pixel. The results
may be considered extremely positive.
The extremely positive results present in Table1, however,
are in accordance with the receptive fields of convolutional
layers. In other words, every neuron in convolutional layers
calculates a convolution of the kernel with a part of the input
image which is of the same size. The convolution itself is
a linear function in which the change in one input would
cause the whole convolution to be affected. Thus, the result
of the convolution will be the same for nearby neurons in
the same receptive field. Consequently, this shows that the
vulnerable part of DNNs were neither neurons nor pixels
but some receptive fields.
Interestingly, completely different networks have a very
similar success rate for both nearby attacks. This further
demonstrate that the receptive field is the vulnerable part.
Since neural networks with similar architectures share sim-
ilar receptive field relationships, nearby attacks on similar
networks should have similar success rate.
8. The Conflicting Salience Hypothesis
Propagation maps demonstrated that some pixels’ influence
failed to reach the last layer (Figure 4) while others influ-
enced the last layer enough to cause a change in class (Fig-
ure 2). This analysis share a close resemblance to saliency
maps in which one wishes to discover which pixels are
responsible for a class. In fact, since propagation maps mea-
sure the ammount of influence from perturbations, it would
be reasonable to assume that they may have a close relation-
ship with disturbance in saliency maps. Consequently, adver-
sarial samples would cause enough disturbance in saliency
maps to cause a change in class. Thus, we raise here the hy-
pothesis of a conflicting saliency from adversarial samples.
If this is true, then what adversarial machine learning is
doing is not fooling DNNs but rather taking away his at-
tention. It is like a magician that calls attention to his right
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Table 1. Success rate of one-pixel attack on both nearby pixels and a single randomly chosen pixel. This experiment is conducted in
the following manner. First the one-pixel attack is executed. Afterwards, the same perturbation is used to modify one random pixel of
the original image and evaluate success of the method. To obtain a statistically relevant result, both random and nearby pixel attack are
repeated once per image for each successful attack in 5000 samples of the CIFAR-10 dataset (in which there are 1638 successful attacks
for Resnet and 2934 successful attacks for Lenet).
LENET RESNET
ORIGINAL ONE-PIXEL ATTACK 59% 33%
ONE-PIXEL ATTACK ON Random Pixels 4.9% 3.1%
ONE-PIXEL ATTACK ON Nearby Pixels 33.1% 31.3%
Figure 9. Average difference for all layers when the attack is
successful, when it fails and the average value of the feature map
without any modification.
hand while his left hand pushes the magic ball. Or like the
blinking light on the street that calls attention of the driver
which suddenly drive through a red traffic light.
Having said that, propagation maps is a feedfoward based
technique to vizualize and measure the influence of a pertur-
bation while saliency maps aim to investigate the salient pix-
els for a given class with backpropagated gradients. There-
fore, the methods differ in many ways and their relationship,
which might be more complex than what is stated here, goes
beyond the scope of this paper. We leave this as an open
question that should be worthwhile to investigate.
9. Conclusions
This paper proposed a novel technique called propagation
maps and used it to analyze one of the most puzzling at-
tacks, the one-pixel attack. The analysis showed how a
pixel modification causes an influence throughout the layers,
culminating in the change of the class. Moreover, a local-
ity analysis revealed that receptive fields are the vulnerable
parts of DNNs and therefore nearby attacks to successful
one-pixel attack have a high success rate. Lastly, a new hy-
pothesis was proposed that could together with the proposed
propagation maps help explain the reason behind adversarial
attacks in DNNs.
Regarding this paper achievements, we highlight the follow-
ing:
• Propagation Maps - A novel technique to estimate
the influence a perturbation can exert over a layer was
proposed. Propagation maps make it easy to under-
stand both the ammount as well as the spreadness of
influence given a perturbation in each layer of a DNN.
• Vulnerability of Receptive Fields - A locality anal-
ysis revealed that success rates on nearby pixels of
successful one-pixel attacks are equally vulnerable.
This demonstrate that pixels or neurons are not the
vulnerable parts but receptive fields.
• The Influence of One-pixel Perturbation - Propaga-
tion maps reveal for the first time how one-pixel pertur-
bation can influence layers of DNNs. Tests conducted
on Resnet show that the perturbation inside neural net-
works grow and spread. In fact, the difference in fea-
ture maps was shown to reach values comparable with
the maximum output of the original feature map.
• Similarity between Successful and Failed Attacks -
In this paper, many tests over successful and failed at-
tacks were made. However, both types of perturbation
shows surprisingly similar behavior. This was shown
to not be necessarily related with a decrease in the con-
fidence with the class label either, i.e., failed attacks
that do not change the confidence may also have a high
influence in all layers of the DNN and behave similarly
to successful attacks.
• The Conflicting Salience Hypothesis - Inspired by
how propagation maps show the influence of pixels
throughout the layers, we raised the hypothesis that
adversarial samples are disturbances in saliency maps.
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Saliency maps share a close resemblance with propaga-
tion maps. Some propagation maps’ results also point
to conclusions that are in accordance with saliency
maps. Both methods, however, come from quasi con-
trary perspectives. For example, saliency maps is a
backpropagated signal while propagation maps is a
feedfowarded one. To further verify the hypothesis
more tests in their relationship are necessary.
Thus, by shedding light into the influence of perturbations
inside any type of DNN, we expect that propagation maps
shall aid the understanding of other attacks as well as the
development of new defenses. They can also be extended to
work together with saliency maps providing yet more clues
to uncover the reasoning behind adversarial samples as well
as how deep neural networks understand the world.
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